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The last decade has seen an increased use of scientif-
ic evidence in criminal prosecutions. As part of this 
development the courts have been faced with the admis-
sibility of evidence based upon the social sciences. The 
latest edition of McCormick contains the following 
commentary: 
In a growing number of cases, litigants have sought to 
introduce expert testimony as to the scientifically 
constructed or validated profiles. Women accused of 
murdering their husbands have pointed to the 
"battered wife syndrome" to support a plea of self-
defense. Prosecutors in sexual abuse cases have 
relied on the "rape trauma syndrome" to negate a 
claim of consent or to explain conflicting statements of 
the complainant. In child abuse and homicide cases, 
prosecutors have called witnesses to establish that 
defendants exhibited the "battering parent syndrome." 
C. McCormick, Evidence 635 (3d ed. 1984). 
rhis article briefly examines several issues relating to 
vhat may be called "syndrome" evidence. 
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
The battered woman syndrome (BWS) describes a 
1attern of violence inflicted on a woman by her mate. Dr. 
.enore Walker, one of the principal researchers in this 
eld, describes a battered woman as follows: 
A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly 
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological 
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do some-
thing he wants her to do without any concern for her 
rights. Battered women include wives or women in any 
form of intimate relationships with men. 
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered 
woman, the couple must go through the battering 
cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an 
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a 
)lie Defender Hyman Friedman 
second time, and she remains in the situation, she is 
defined as a battered woman~ L. Walker, The Battered 
Woman xv (1979). 
The violence associ?ted with this type of relationship is 
neither constant nor random. Instead, it follows a pattern. 
Dr. Walker has identified a three stage cycle of violence. 
/d. at 55-70. The first stage is the "tension building" 
phase, during which small abusive episodes occur. 
These episodes gradually escalate over a period of time. 
The tension continues to build until the second stage-
the acute battering phase- erupts. During this phase, in 
which most injuries occur, the battering is out of control. 
Psychological abuse in the form of threats of future harm 
is also prevalent. The third phase is a calm loving period 
in which the batterer is contrite, seeks forgiveness, and 
promises to refrain from future violence. This phase 
provides a positive reinforcement for the woman to 
continue the relationship in the hope that the violent 
behavior will not recur. The cycle then repeats itself. In 
addition, the batterer is often extremely jealous of the 
woman's time and attemtioll, a factor that further isolates 
her from friends and outside support. Note, Self-Defense: 
Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial, 20 Cal. W.L. Rev. 
485, 487-88 (1984). Numerous obstacles, both psycholog-
ical and economic, often prevent the battered spouse 
from leaving her mate; she feels "trapped in a deadly 
situation." Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's 
Ken: Battered Women, 7 Vt. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1982). Caught 
in this cycle, the battered woman sometimes strikes back 
and kills. 
Courts and scientists have accepted the validity of the 
battered woman syndrome. See Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 
F. Supp. 451,459 {E.D. Pa. 1985)("The general accep-
tance of expert testimony on the battered woman 
syndrome has been acknowledged by legal authorities 
as well as the scientific community."). One commentator, 
however, has challenged its scientific basis: 
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The work of Lenore Walker, the leading researcher on 
battered woman syndrome, is unsound and largely 
irrelevant to the central issues ... The Walker cycle 
theory suffers from significant methodological and 
interpretive flaws that render it incapable of explaining 
why an abused woman strikes out at her mate when 
she does. Similarly, Walker's application of learned 
helplessness to the situation of battered women does 
not account tor the actual behavior of many women 
who remain in battering relationships. Note, The 
Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal 
and Empirical Dissent, 72 Va. L. Rev. 619, 647 (1986). 
Admissibility 
The admissibility of evidence of the battered woman 
syndrome has divided the courts. See generally Annat., 
Admissibility of Expert Opinion Testimony on Battered 
Wife or Battered Woman Syndrome, 18 A.L.R.4th 1154 
(1982). An analysis of the admissibility of such evidence 
raises several issues. The first issue concerns the 
relevancy of BWS evidence. Typically, the evidence is 
offered in support of a self-defense claim in a homicide 
prosecution. A few courts have declared BWS evidence 
to be simply irrelevant to a self-defense claim. See Field-
er v. State, 683 S.W.2d 565, 593 (Tex. Grim. App. 1985); 
People v. White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072, 414 N.E.2d 
196, 200 (1980); State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660, 663-65 
(La. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 
521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981). See also State v. Martin, 
666 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)(expert testimo-
ny not admissible since prima facie case of self-defense 
not made); State v. Moore, 72 Or. App. 454, 459, 695 P.2d 
985,987-88 (1985)(witness not qualified to testify about 
BWS). 
Being a battered woman, by itself, is no defense to 
homicide. State v. Walker, 40 Wash. App. 658, 665, 700 
P.2d 1168, 1173 (1985)("That the defendant is a victim of a 
battering relationship is not alone sufficient evidence to 
submit the issue of self-defense to a jury."). Neverthe-
less, the BWS may explain two elements of a self-
defense claim: (1) the defendant's subjective fear of seri-
ous injury or death and (2) the reasonableness of that 
belief. See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 
§ 5.7 (2d ed. 1986); 2 P. Robinson, Criminal Law 
Defenses § 132 (1984). A number of courts recognize the 
relevancy of BWS evidence for this purpose. E.g., Terry v. 
State, 467 So. 2d 761, 763-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); 
Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1982); State v. Hundley, 235 Kan. 461, 467, 693 P.2d 
475, 479 (1985); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 
1981); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 202-05, 478 A.2d 364, 
375-77 (1984); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 820 
(N.D. 1983); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 134, 488 
N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). See also May v. 
State, 460 So. 2d 778, 78.5 (Miss. 1984)("the battered wife 
syndrome has important informational and explanatory 
power ... "). For example, BWS evidence is relevant to 
explain why the battered woman has not left her mate. 
According to one court, "[o]nly by understanding these 
unique pressures that force battered women to remain 
with their mates, despite their long-standing and 
reasonable fear of severe bodily harm and the isolation 
that being a battered woman creates, can a battered 
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woman's state of mind be accurately and fairly under-
stood." State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 196,478 A.2d 364, 372 
(1984). In addition, another court has admitted BWS 
evidence for the purpose of explaining a battered 
woman's conduct after killing her mate. People v. Minnis, ( 
118 Ill. App. 3d 345, 356-57, 455 N.E.2d 209, 217-18 
(1983). 
A second issue is whether BWS evidence is a proper 
subject for expert testimony. Several courts have held 
that this subject is "within the understanding of the jury" 
and thus inappropriate for expert testimony. Fielder v. 
State, 683 S.W.2d 565, 594 (Tex. Grim. App. 1985); State 
v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 
(1981). Most courts disagree, finding that "a battering 
relationship embodies psychological and societal 
features that are not well understood by lay observers." 
State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 209, 478 A.2d 364, 379 (1984). 
See also lbn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 
634-35 (D.C. 1979), on remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); 
Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 618-19, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 
(1981); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 134, 488 
N.Y.S.2d 358,362 (Sup. Ct. 1985); State v. Hill, 287 S.C. 
398, 339 S.E.2d 121, 122 (1986); State v. Allery, 101 
Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984). 
A final issue relates to the scientific basis for BWS 
evidence. Some courts have excluded expert testimony 
on this subject because its scientific validity has not been 
sufficiently established. lbn:ramas v. United States, 455 
A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 
518, 521-22, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981) (BWS not suffi-
ciently developed as scientific knowledge); Buhrle v. 
State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981)(record did not 
establish scientific basis). Rejecting this argument, other 
courts have concluded that a "sufficient scientific basis" 
has been established. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178,211,478 
A.2d 364, 380 (1984). For example, one court has written: 
[T]he theory underlying the battered woman's 
syndrome has indeed passed beyond the experimen-
tal stage and gained a substantial enough scientific 
acceptance to warrant admissibility ... [N]umerous 
articles and books have been published about the 
battered woman's syndrome; and recent findings of 
researchers in the field have confirmed its presence 
and thereby indicated that the scientific community 
accepts its underlying premises. People v. Torres, 128 
Misc. 2d 129, 135, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 363 (Sup. Ct. 1985). 
Accord State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 716 P.2d 563, 569 
(1986); State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 719 P.2d 1268, 
1274 (N.M. App. Ct. 1986). 
Related Issues 
The battered woman syndrome has generated a 
number of incidental issues. One court has held 
evidence of the defendant's prior aggressive behavior 
toward the victim inadmissible to rebut BWS evidence. 
State v. Kelly, 102 Wash.2d 188, 685 P.2d 564 (1984). 
Another court found that defense counsel's failure to 
introduce expert testimony on the battered woman 
syndrome did not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d 322, 328 (6th Cir. 
1984). In the trial of a man for the attempted murder of hi! 
wife, a New Hampshire court upheld the introduction of 
BWS evidence to rebut an insanity defense. State v. 
Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775-76, 424 A.2d 171, 173 {1980). In 
Jahnke v. State,· 682 P.2d 991, 997 (Wyo. 1984), the court 
rejected the admissibility of "battered son" testimony 
because the evidence showed that the defendant was 
not under attack at the time of the killing. 
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BATTERING PARENT PROFILE 
The battering parent profile must be distinguished 
from the battered child syndrome. Both issues arise in 
cases in which a parent is prosecuted for inflicting injury 
to or causing the death of a child. Typically, evidence of 
the battered child syndrome involves medical testimony 
based on the victim's medical history and injuries; it is 
admissible to show that the injuries to the child were 
intentional rather than accidental, State v. Tanner, 675 
P.2d 539, 543 (Utah 1983)("the pattern of abuse is rele-
vant to show that someone injured the child intentionally, 
rather than accidentally."); or to show that "the parent's 
explanation of the child's injuries is a fabrication." United 
States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527, 529 (5th Cir. 1981). Many 
courts have permitted this type of expert testimony. E.g., 
State v. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d 778, 783-84 (Minn. 1982); 
State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302, 307-08 (S.D. 1984); 
Annat., Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony on 
Battered Child Syndrome, 98 A.L.R.3d 306 (1980). 
In contrast, the battering parent profile involves the 
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psychological and demographic profile of typical abusing 
parents. It is offered to show that the defendant, the 
parent, fits the profile and thus is more likely to have 
battered the child. In sum, the battered child syndrome 
focuses on the child's physical condition, while the batter-
ing parent profile focuses on the parent's characteristics. 
The battering parent profile is an offshoot of the 
research on the battered child syndrome. See McCoid, 
The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family: 
Part One, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (1965); John, Child 
Abuse-The Battered Child Syndrome, 2 Am: Jur. Proof of 
Facts 2d 365, 404-07 (1974). Researchers have not only 
attempted to identify the physical attributes of an abused 
child but also the characteristics of parents who abuse 
their children. One expert testified that the profile of a 
battering parent consists of the following characteristics: 
(1) the parent herself is the product of a violent, abusive 
environment; (2) the parent is under some kind of chronic 
environmental stress, caused, for example, by money or 
housing problems, and is frequently a single parent; (3) 
the parent has a history of poor social judgment, tending 
to be impulsive or explosive under stress; (4) the abused 
child is the product of an unplanned or difficult pregnan-
cy; and (5) the abused child is a chronically difficult child. 
Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70,73-74, 303 S.E.2d 13, 16 
(1983). A commentator summarized the profile as 
follows: 
[A]busing parents seem to have low self esteem, poor 
impulse control, low empathy, low frustration tolerance, 
and inadequate knowledge of basic child development 
and of parenting skills. In addition, they are more likely 
than non-abusers to manifest diagnosable psycho-
pathology, or other serious emotional problems. 
Apart from such personality characteristics, abusing 
parents in the reported studies were themselves al-
most universally abused or neglected as children. As 
adults, they tend to social isolation, and are likely to be 
under environmental stress, often belonging to lower 
socio-economic groups. Note, The Battering Parent 
Syndrome: Inexpert Testimony as Character Evidence, 
17 Mich. J. L. Reform 653, 658-59 (1984). 
Admissibility 
Only a few courts have considered the admissibility of 
the battering parent profile. Several courts have treated 
the profile as evidence of the defendant's character; that 
is, to show that the defendant matches the profile and 
therefore is more likely to have committed the particular 
abuse charged. Generally, character evidence is inad-
missible unless the defendant first introduces evidence 
of his own good character. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)("Evi-
dence of a person's character or a trait of his character is 
not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion ... "). Since 
the defendants in these cases had not introduced char-
acter evidence, the courts have excluded expert testimo-
ny concerning the battering parent profile: 
[U]nless a defendant has placed her character in issue 
or has raised some defense which the battering parent 
syndrome is relevant to rebut, the state may not 
introduce evidence of the syndrome, nor may the state 
introduce character evidence showing a defendant's 
personality traits and personal history as it$ found~tion 
for demonstrating the defendant has the characteris-
tics of a typical battering parent. Sanders v. State, 251 
Ga. 70, 76, 303 S.E.2d 13, 18 (1983). 
Accord State v. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d 778, 785 (Minn. 
1982); State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981}. 
Other courts have held such testimony inadmissible 
because it lacks probative value and entails a risk of 
unfair prejudice. As one court has noted, such "evidence 
invites a jury to conclude that because the defendant has 
been identified by ari expert with experience in child 
abuse cases as a member of a group having a higher 
incidence of child sexual abuse, it is more likely the 
defendant committed the crime." State v. Maul, 35 Wash. 
App. 287, 293, 667 P.2d 96, 99 (1983). Accord Duley v. 
State, 56 Md. App. 275,281,467 A.2d 776,780 (1983). 
None of the reported cases has explicitly excluded 
evidence of the profile on the ground that it is unreliable. 
One court, however, indicated that it would reconsider its 
decision to exclude profile evidence if "further evidence 
of the scientific accuracy and reliability of syndrome or 
profile diagnoses can be established." State v. Loebach, 
310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981}. 
The Maine Supreme Court has held expert testimony 
on the battering parent profile admissible. The evidence, 
however, was offered by the defense in this case. In State 
v. Con Iogue, 474 A.2d 167 (Me. 1984}, the defendant 
attempted to show that the mother of the child, and not 
he, had injured the child. The mother had initially admit-
ted that she had injured the child but later recanted and 
testified as a prosecution witness. A prosecution expert 
testified that the child was a victim of the battered child 
syndrome and on cross-examination stated that the 
mother had admitted striking the child. The defense, 
however, was preciiJ<:led from eliciti_ngadditional testimo-
ny from the expert which would have shown that the 
mother had also admitted that she herself had been 
abused and that abused children often become abusive 
parents. The Maine Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the evidence was relevant to show that the mother 
and not the defendant had committed the crime: "[A] 
description of battered child syndrome and the likelihood 
that [the mother's] own history of child abuse would 
predispose her to abuse her own child, would have 
allowed the jury to weigh the credibility of [the mother's] 
confession against the credibility of her later retrac-
tion."ld. at 173. 
RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME 
The phrase rape trauma syndrome (RTS) was coined 
by Burgess and Holstrom to describe the behavioral, 
somatic, and psychological reactions of rape and 
attempted rape victims. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape 
Trauma Syndrome, 131 Am. J. Psychiatry 981 (1974). See 
also Burgess, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1 Behav. Sci. & 
Law 97 (Summer 1983}. Rape trauma.syndrome can be 
viewed as a type of post-traumatic stress disorder. See 
generally Erlinder, Paying the Price for Vietnam: Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder and Criminal Behavior, 25 
B.C.L. Rev. 305 (1984}; Symposium, Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorders, 1 Behav. Sci. & Law 7-129 (Summer 1983). 
Based on interviews with 146 women, Burgess and 
Holmstrom found that victims usually progress through a 
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two-phase process - an acute phase and a long-term 
reorganization process. Impact reactions in the acute 
phase involve either an "expressed style" in which fear, 
anger and anxiety are manifested, or a "controlled style" 
in which these feelings are masked by a composed or 
subdued behavior. Somatic reactions include physical 
trauma, skeletal muscle tension, gastrointestinal irritabili-
ty, and genitourinary disturbance. In addition, a wide 
gamut of emotional reactions, ranging from fear, humilia-
tion, and embarrassment to anger, revenge, and self-
blame are exhibited, The second phase, the reorganiza-
tion phase, typically begins two to six weeks after the 
attack, andjs.a Qer:!9_cl_inwhich the victim attempts to 
reestablish her life. This period is characterized by motor 
activity, such as changing residences, changing tele-
phone numbers, or visiting family members. Nightmares 
and dreams are common during this phase. In addition, 
victims often suffer rape-related phobias, such as fear of 
being alone, fear of having people behind them, and 
difficulties in sexual relationships. Burgess & Holmstrom, 
Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 Am. J. Psychiatry 981, 
981c84 (1974}. 
Numerous other studies elaborated on the initial 
research, sometimes confirming the earlier studies and 
sometimes adding to them. The focus of this research, 
however, was to understand the victim's reactions in 
order to provide assistance to the victim. The focus was 
not to evaluate a victim's reactions in order to establish 
the fact that a rape had occurred, which is how RTS is 
sometimes used at trial. The legal commentators 
disagree about the value of RTS for this latter purpose. 
Some believe that RTS evidence should be admissible. 
See Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: 
The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for 
Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 395 
(1985); Ross;-TheGverlooked Expert in Rape Prosecu-
tions, 14 U. Tol. L Rev. 707 (1983); Comment, Expert 
Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: Admissibility and 
Effective Use in Criminal Rape Prosecution, 33 Am. U.L. 
Rev. 417 (1984). Others question the scientific basis for 
RTS evidence. One commentator, after surveying the 
literature, concluded that "definitional problems, biased 
research samples, and the inherent complexity of the 
phenomenon vitiate all attempts to establish empirically 
the causal relationship implicit in the concept of a rape 
trauma syndrome." Note, Checking the Allure of 
Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal 
Proceedings, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1657, 1678 (1984). Some of 
the research problems include (1) unrepresentative 
samples, (2) the failure to distinguish between victims of 
rapes, attempted rapes, and molestation, and (3) the fail-
ure to account for individual idiosyncratic and incident-
specific reactions. /d. at 1678-80. 
Admissibility 
The courts have divided on the admissibility of RTS 
evidence to establish the fact of rape, i.e., lack of 
consent. See Annat., Admissibility, at Criminal Prosecu-
tion, of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 42 
A.L.R.4th 879 (1985). The Minnesota Supreme Court has 
ruled that "[r]ape trauma syndrome is not the type of 
scientific test that accurately and reliably determines 
whether a rape has occurred." State v. Saldana, 324 · 
N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn. 1982). Accord State v. McGee, 
324 N.W.2d 232, 233 (Minn. 1982). See also Allewalt v. 
State, 61 Md. App. 503, 516, 487 A.2d 664, 6l0 (1985) 
(limited probative value of RTS evidence outweighed by 
prejudicial effect), cert. granted, 493 A.2d 351 (1985). 
Other courts have excluded RTS evidence because it has 
not been generally accepted by the scientific community. 
For example, the California Supreme Court lias noted that 
rape trauma syndrome was not devised to determine 
the "truth" or "accuracy" of a particular past event-
i.e., whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense occurred 
- but rather was developed by professional rape 
coun_selors as a therapeutic tool, to help identify, 
predict and treat emotional problems experienced by 
the counselors' clients or patients. People v. Bledsoe, 
36 Cal. 3d 236, 249-50, 681 P.2d 291, 300, 203 Cal. 
Rptr. 450, 459 (1984). 
Thus, according to the court, although generally accept-
ed by the s_cientific community for a therapeutic purpose, 
expert testimony on RTS was not generally accepted "to 
prove that a rape in fact occurred." /d. at 251, 681 P.2d at 
301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460. See also People v. Hampton, 
728 P2d 345, 348 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Taylor, 
663 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Mo. 1984). 
The California Supreme Court, however, apparently 
approved the admissibility of RTS where the defendant 
suggests to the jury that the conduct of the victim after 
the incident, such as a delay in reporting the assault, is 
inconsistent with the claim of rape. In this situation, the 
court wrote, "expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome 
may play a particularly useful role by disabusing the jury 
ot s?me widely ~eld misconceptions about rape and rape 
vJctJms, so that 1t may evaluate the evidence free of ... 
popular myths." 36 Cal. 3d at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 
Cal. Rptr. at 457. Several courts have admitted RTS 
evidence for this latter purpose. E.g., Commonwealth v. 
Gallagher, 353 Pa. Super. 426, 433-35, 510 A.2d 735, 
7~8~39 (1986) (RTS syndrome admitted to explain why 
VJCtJm could Identify defendant four years after assault 
when she could not do so two weeks later); Perez v. State, 
653 S.W.2d 878, 882 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)(in rebuttal 
ex~ert explained alleged victim's conduct of passive 
resistance during rape). 
Other courts, however, have gone beyond this limited 
use of RTS evidence and permitted its use to establish 
lack of consent. For example, the Kansas Supreme Court 
has written: 
An examination of the literature clearly demonstrates 
that the so-called "rape trauma syndrome" is generally 
accepted to be a common reaction to sexual 
assault ... As such, qualified expert psychiatric 
testimony regarding the existence of rape trauma 
syndrome is relevant and admissible in a case such as 
this where the defense is consent. State v. Marks, 231 
Kan. 645, 654, 647 P2d 1292, 1299 (1982). 
The Arizona Supreme Court has reached the same 
concl~~ion: "[IJf properly presented by a person qualified 
by trammg and experience such as a psychiatrist or 
psychologist, ... such evidence is admissible to show 
lack of consent. This testimony would not invade the 
province of the jury." State v. Huey, 145 Ariz. 59, 699 P.2d 
1290, 1294 (1985). Accord State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 918, 
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922-23 (Mont. 1984); State v. Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d 
246, 247, 475 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1984). 
References 
For other articles on rape trauma syndrome, see 
Buchele & Buchele, Legal and Psychological Issues in 
the Use of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 
25 Washburn L.J. 26 (1985); McCord, The Admissibility of 
Expert Testimony Regarding Rape Trauma Syndrome in 
Rape Prosecutions, 26 B.C. L. Rev. 1143 (1985); Note, 
Rape Trauma Syndrome, 50 Mo. L. Rev. 947 (1985); 
Comment, The Use of Rape Trauma Syndrome as 
Evidence in a Rape Trial: Valid or Invalid?, 21 Wake Forest 
L. Rev. 93 (1985); Note, The Footprints of Fear: Prosecu-
tion Use of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 
33 Wayne L. Rev. 179 (1986). 
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
ACCOMMODATION SYNDROME 
The phrase "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation 
Syndrome" was coined by Dr. Roland Summit in an arti-
cle by that title in 7 Child Abuse & Neglect 177 (1983) to 
describe five categories of reactions typical of child sexu-
al abuse victims. The first two are preconditions to child 
s~x~~l abuse; t_he last three are "sequential contingen-
~~e~ th~t_vary 1n both form and degree. The five categor-
Ies Identified by Dr. Summit are: 
(1) Secrecy: The child receives the message, either 
explicitly through threats or admonishments or 
implicitly, that the subject is to be kept secret. An 
aura of danger and secrecy surrounds the inci-
dent(s)./d.181. 
(2) Helplessness: The imbalance of power that exists 
between child and adult makes the child feel power-
less to resist. The feeling of helplessness is 
increased when the abuser is a trusted friend or 
family member.ld. at 182-83. 
(3) Entrapment and Accommodation: The child who 
does not seek or receive intervention learns to live 
with the sexual abuse in order to survive. In addition 
to submitting to the sexual abuse, other examples of 
s~rvival mechanisms include turning to imaginary 
fnends~ developing multiple personalities, taking 
refuge 1n altered states of consciousness, substance 
abuse, running away, promiscuity, hysterical 
phenomena, delinquency, sociopathy, projection of 
rage ahd self-mutilation./d. 184-86. 
(4) Delayed, conflicting and unconvincing disclosure: 
Rarely will the child report incidents of sexual abuse 
immediately upon their occurrence. Because of the 
time lapse before report occurs and the emotional 
~pheaval experienced by the child, the disclosure is 
likely to contain contradictions and misstatements. 
Often the disclosure is greeted by disbelief. /d. at 
186. 
(5) Retraction: "Whatever a child says about sexual 
abuse she is likely to reverse it." /d. at 188. Particu-
larly if the abuser is a family member, the child will 
attempt to undo the disintegration of the family 
caused by the disclosure. /d. 
. Typically, testimony concerning the syndrome is 
Introduced to explainthe contradictory behavior, such as 
delayed disclosure or retraction, of child sexual abuse 
victims. However, with varying results, experts have 
given opinions relating to whether children lie about 
sexual abuse (State v. Brotherton, 384 N .W.2d 375, 379 
(Iowa 1986) (excluded), Lantrip v. Commonwealth, 713 
S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky. 1986) (excluded), State v. Myers, 382 
N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 1986) (excluded), State v. Raye, 73 
N.C. App. 273, 276-77, 326 S.E.2d 333, 335 (1985) (admit-
ted)); whether the child is a victim of sexual abuse 
(People v. Draper, 105 Mich. App. 481, 485-88, 389 
N.W.2d 89, 92 (1986) (admitted), Allison v. State, 179 Ga. 
App. 303, 346 S.E.2d 380, 382-85 (1986) (admitted}, State 
v. Jackson, 239 Kan. 463, 721 P.2d 232, 237-38 (1986) 
(excluded), State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684, 
68!5 (1986) (admitted), State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 
652, 656-57, 694 P.2d 117, 1121 (1985) (excluded), State v. 
Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 601-09, 645 P.2d 1330, 1338-39 
(1982) (admitted), State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1200-01 
(Utah 1984) (admitted), People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 
3d 1093, 1098-1101,215 Cal. Rptr. 45,48-50 (1985) 
(excluded for this purpose)); whether a child's behavior is 
consistent with abuse (Russell v. State, 712 S.W.2d 916, 
916-17 (Ark. 1986) (excluded), State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 
472, 720 P.2d 73, 75-76 (1986) (excluded)); the profile of 
the child sexual abuse perpetrator (People v. Wilder, 146 
Ill. App. 3d 586, 496 N.E.2d 1182, 1185 (1986) (admitted), 
State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 293, 667 P.2d 96, 99 
(1983) (excluded for this purpose), Hall v. State, 15 Ark. 
App. 309, 316-17, 692 S.W.2d 769, 773 (1985) (excluded)); 
and even, whether the defendant sexually abused the 
child complainant (Keri v. State, 179 Ga. App. 664, 347 
S.E.2d 236, 238 (1986} (admitted), State v. Logue, 372 
N.W.2d 151, 157 (S.D. 1985) (excluded), State v. Jackson, 
239 Kan.463, 721 P.2d 232, 237-38 (1986) (excluded)). 
Admission 
Most of the courts which have considered the admissi-
bility of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome 
evidence have permitted experts to describe and explain 
typical reactions of child sexual abuse victims. United 
States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1986); Unit-
ed States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985); 
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73, 74-76 (1986}; 
People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1098-1101,215 
Cal. Rptr. 45, 48-50 (1985); State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 
607, 645 P.2d 1330, 1338 (1982); State v. Myers, 382 
N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 1986); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 
604, 609-610 (Minn. 1984); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 
427, 432-38, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219-21 (1983); State v. 
Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 573-76, 683 P.2d 173, 178-80 
(1984). 
The admissibility of expert testimony concerning child 
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is analyzed 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or the state equiva-
lent, which provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise. 
The keys to admissibility under Rule 702 are the likeli-
hood that the testimony will assist the jury to understand 
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the evidence or determine a fact in issue, and the qualifi-
cations of the witness. 
Often in child sexual abuse cases, there is no indepen-
dent evidence that the sexual abuse occurred: 
The sexual offender is often a relative or a trusted adult ( 
with whom the child spends time alone. Eyewitnesses 
to the molestation are therefore rare. In addition, sexu-
al abuse is typically a nonviolent crime. Children who 
are abused by a trusted adult usually are manipulated 
psychologically and do not resist their abusers. Physi-
cal injury can provide valuable medical evidence of the 
sexual abuse, but this evidence often is lacking because 
the abuse is committed without force. Furthermore, the 
sexual abuse may involve an act other than penetration 
of the vagina or anus. Crimes such as petting, fondling 
or oral copulation usually do not involve forceful physi-
cal contact and do not leave physical scars. A lapse of 
time between the sexual abuse and disclosure may 
also contribute to the lack of medical evidence. Note, 
The Admissibility of Child Sexual Abuse Accommoda-
tion Syndrome in California, 17 Pac. L.J. 1368-69 (1986). 
Additionally, the typical response of child sexual abuse 
victims are counter-intuitive in manyJespects. Delayed 
disclosure, conflicting testimony, and retraction suggest 
fabrication on the part of the child complainant unless an 
explanation is offered for this anomalous behavior. In 
those cases where there is no independent evidence that 
the abuse occurred, the jury's determination of the credi-
bility of the child complainant and the defendant will be 
dispositive. In the words of one court: 
It would be useful to the jury to know that not just this 
victim but many child victims are ambivalent about the 
forcefulness with which they want to pursue the com-
plaint, and it is not uncommon for them to deny the act 
ever happenl:l_ci. Explaining this superficially bizarre 
behavior by identifying its emotional antecedents could 
help the jury better assess the witness' credibility. State 
v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 436, 657 P.2d 1215, 1220 (1983). 
Another court wrote: 
We cannot assume that the average juror is familiar 
with the behavioral characteristics of victims of child 
molesting. Knowledge of such characteristics may well 
aid the jury in weighing the testimony of the alleged 
child victim. Children who have been the victims of 
sexual abuse or molestation may exhibit behavioral 
patterns (e.g. recantation, conflicting versions of 
events, confusion or inarticulate descriptions) which 
jurors might attribute to inaccuracy or prevarication, 
but which may be merely the result of immaturity, 
psychological stress, societal pressures or similar 
factors as well as of their interaction. Jurors, most of 
whom are unfamiliar with the behavioral sciences, may 
well benefit from expert testimony of the general type 
offered in the present case ... State v. Lindsey, 149 
Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73, 74-75 (1986). 
However, the Arkansas Supreme Court excluded an 
opinion that the complainant's statements were consis-
tent with sexual abuse, because the evidence was not 
beyond the jury's ability to understand and draw its own 
conclusions. Russell v. State, 289 Ark. 533, 712 S.W.2d 
916, 917 (1986). Two facts distinguish Russell from the 
other cases which admitted similar testimony. First, the 
testimony came from the state's first witness and on 
direct examination. Thus, the defendant had not had 
even the opportunity to attack the complainant's credibili-
ty. Second, it does not appear that the child complainant 
had displayed the bizarre behavior of the type requiring 
explanation. 
The conditions of admissibility have not yet developed 
sufficiently to provide well-defined guidelines. For 
instance, whether testimony on child sexual abuse 
accommodation syndrome will be permitted only after 
the credibility of the complaining witness has been 
attacked is not clear. However, the nature of the child 
sexual abuse defense is a denial and necessarily entails 
an attack on the credibility of the complaining witness' 
testimony. 
At least one court of appeals has limited the admissi-
bility of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome 
evidence to circumstances similar to those presented in 
the state supreme court case in which it was held admis-
sible. In State v. Hall, 392 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. App. 1986), 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals interpreted State v. 
Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984), to permit child 
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome evidence only 
"in cases involving (1) the intra-familial sexual abuse (2) 
of a young child where (3) the expert's knowledge would 
help the jury to evaluate the credibility of the 
complainant." State v. Hall, 392 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. 
App. 1986), rehearing granted. 
People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1099, 215 Cal. Rptr. 
45 (1985), analogized child sexual abuse accommoda-
tion syndrome to rape trauma syndrome evidence, and 
limits expert testimony to rehabilitate the complainant's 
credibility "to a discussion of victims as a class, support-
ed by references to literature and experience (such as an 
expert normally relies upon) and does not extend to 
discussion and diagnosis of the witness in the case at 
hand." /d. at 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50. Accord United 
States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985). 
Exclusion 
Many of those courts that admit expert testimony 
explaining or describing typical reactions of child sexual 
abuse victims exclude conclusions drawn by the experts 
as to whether the children involved are telling the truth, 
whether the children involved are victims of sexual 
abuse, and whether children in general lie about sexual 
abuse. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340-41 (8th 
Cir. 1986); State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73, 
76-77 (1986); People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 
1099-1101, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 50 (1985); State v. Myers, 
382 N.W.2d 91, 95-97 (Iowa 1986); State v. Jackson, 239 
Kan. 463, 721 P.2d 232, 237-38 (1986); State v. Myers, 359 
N.W.2d 604, 611 (Minn. 1984); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 
427, 438, 657 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1983). 
The reasoning the courts use to exclude expert 
testimony on the issue of credibility is that such conclu-
sions usurp the tact-finding/credibility determining func-
tion ot the jury. Federal Rule of Evidence 704 permits 
some opinion evidence that embraces ultimate issues of 
tact. However, Rule 704 must be read in conjunction with 
the requirement of Rule 702 that the opinion be helpful to 
the trier of fact. Because there is no proven method for 
determining whether a witness is telling the truth, the 
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expert's opinion would not be helpful. In the words of the 
Arizona Supreme Court: 
Thus, even where expert testimony on behavioral 
characteristics that affect credibility or accuracy of 
observation is allowed, experts should not be allowed 
to give their opinion of the accuracy, reliability or credi-
bility of a particular witness in the case being tried ... 
Opinion evidence on who is telling the truth in cases 
such as this is nothing more than the expert's opinion 
on how the case should be decided ... [SJuch testimo-
ny is inadmissible, both because it usurps the jury's 
traditional functions and roles and because, when 
given insight into the behavioral sciences, the jury 
needs nothing further from the experts. State v. Lind-
sey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986). 
In addition to Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 704, 
some courts have considered the effect of Federal Rule 
608. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 
1986); State v. Heath, 316 N.C. 337, 341 S.E.2d 565, 567-68 
(1986). Rule 608 limits the form which rehabilitation of 
credibility may take to opinions as to the witness' charac-
ter for truthfulness. Thus, Rule 608 precludes an expert 
from testifying that a witness is telling the truth on a par-
ticular occasion. 
However, in State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 645 P.2d 1330 
(1982), the Hawaii Supreme Court permitted an expert to 
testify that he found the compiaining witness believable. 
The court analyzed the admissibility of the testimony 
under Rules 403 and 702 and admitted the testimony 
because its probative value outweighed its prejudicial 
effect, and the testimony would be helpful to the jury. It 
should be noted that even the Hawaii Court expressed 
some discomfort in permitting the expert to testify that he 
found the complaining witness believable: "The opinion, 
in itself, appears to encroach upon the heart of the jury's 
f(.!nction of assessing credibility." /d. at 609, 645 P.2d at 
1338. The court, however, evidently found that the limita-
tions on such opinion testimony were more a matter of 
form than substance, stating, "we hesitate to simply 
exclude all such testimony insofar as it may, upon occa-
sion, serve the simple purpose of clarifying and consoli-
dating the gist of the expert's testimony, thereby avoiding 
'awkward and confusing circumlocutions.' " /d. 
In State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684, 685-86 
(1986), a pediatrician was permitted to testify that, based 
on a physical examination of the child and statements 
made by the child to the pediatrician, the child was a vic-
tim of sexual abuse. This case is distinguishable from the 
others discussed in that the expert was a pediatrician, and 
the opinion was based in part on a physical examination 
of the child which revealed evidence of sexual abuse. 
Related Issues 
An issue related to child sexual abuse accommodation 
syndrome is whether an expert should be permitted to 
testify that the defendant fits a child sexual abuser 
profile, or exhibits characteristics identified with higher 
incidence of child sexual abuse. Hall v. State, 15 Ark. 
App. 309, 692 S.W.2d 769 (1985); People v. Wilder, 146 Ill. 
App. 586, 496 N.E.2d 1182, 1185 (1986); State v. Petrich, 
101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984). Such testimony is 
subject to the balancing analysis of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403, and is excluded if the court determines 
tnanlie prejudicial effect of identifying the defendant as a 
member of a class with a higher rate of child sexual 
abuse outweighs the probative value of the testimony. In 
Hall v. State,J5 Ark. App. 309, 316-17, 692 S.W.2d 769, 
773 (1985), and State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 576, 
683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984), the testimony which matched 
defendant's characteristics with traits of child sexual 
abusers was deemed overly prejudicial and was, there-
tore, excluded. 
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